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Upon reaching the crest of the ridge at Semla1, the vastness of the 
scene became oppressive. The lofty snowy range shone from the 
dense azure of the heavens… Below was heaped a shattered mass 
of mountains, peaks and glens, ridges and valleys, some aridly 
bare, others luxuriantly rich. The ready materials for another 
world. [Lloyd 1840: 140] 
 —Major Sir William Lloyd, 1821
Our policy is to keep clear of intrusion all the approaches to India, 
and to hold in our hands the keys of all its gates. […] The outer 
frontier of the British dominion that our policy now requires us to 
defend, has immense circumstance. […] The consequence of this 
expansion of our sphere of political influence far beyond the area 
of our actual dominion is that the frontiers of the British Empire 
are changing their character. [Lyall 1911: 375]
—Sir Alfred Lyall, 1911
Introduction
For those concerned with the geo-political expansion of 
British India, the nine decades stretching between these 
two authors presented a variety of frontier configurations 
on the subcontinent. Besides demarcating the often-vague 
limits of territorial expansion, frontiers represented a 
variety of imperial ambitions, fears, and technological 
realities. As British India’s northern boundaries were 
mapped and information about them was compiled to 
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produce more detailed systems of knowledge, the concept 
of frontier space became solidly tied to imperial security.  
Paradoxically, the more that became known about this 
frontier, the less “secure” it would become. By the close 
of the 19th century, this need for security beyond the 
Himalaya induced Britain to invade Tibet in order to 
forcibly establish diplomatic and commercial relations. 
The northwestern Himalayan border established by the 
British at the end of the first half of the 19th century 
still remains mostly intact today. Its’ exact location and 
ownership, however, remain contentious in several places. 
The post-independence Government of India classified its 
easternmost regions as part of the “inner line,” a space 
deemed off-limits to visitors (and in some cases, non-local 
Indians) for much of the 20th century, on the grounds of 
national security. Security has thus been at the forefront 
of British and Indian government policies regarding the 
region for well over a century. However, this was not 
always and exclusively so. Initially acquired through 
expansionistic wars, the region became—for several 
decades at least—a kind of laboratory for experiments in 
commercial and technological endeavors. 
This article aims to examine the different ways in 
which British administrators viewed the northwestern 
Himalayan frontier from their early encounters with 
the region in the beginning of the 19th century up to 
the (partial) construction of the Hindustan-Tibet Road 
(1850s) and its immediate aftermath. Geographically 
speaking, this paper focuses on the western side of the 
northwestern Himalaya, which encompasses the modern 
Indian districts of Kinnaur, Kullu, Lahaul and Spiti, and 
Leh. As its’ primary sources are largely official and British, 
its’ perspective is accordingly constricted.  Materials that 
could give us crucial and contradictory local perspectives 
on this particular intrusion into the region do not, to my 
knowledge, exist.2 It is important for readers to note that 
while the project of building the Hindustan-Tibet Road—
the focus of this paper—required the labor of hundreds of 
thousands of human beings, their voices remain silent.  
Furthermore, as the British had very limited knowledge of, 
and interaction with the eastern side of the northwestern 
Himalaya on the Tibetan plateau during the period under 
consideration3 this paper will omit any substantive 
discussion of Tibetan and Chinese political history in the 
early to mid 19th century.4 The perception of the region 
as being commercially tied to Central Asia (and thus 
within the expanding commercial and political sphere of 
Russia5) prevented British administrators from articulating 
a “backdoor to China” argument for regional expansion, 
a common reason given for attempting to commercially 
and politically engage with Tibet. The episode of the 
Hindustan-Tibet Road is notable, in part, for the absence 
of any mention of establishing communication with Lhasa, 
which was, as Alastair Lamb has argued, a dominant 19th 
century British rationale for expansion into the broader 
Himalayan region. 
By examining this particular episode in British frontier 
formation, I hope to show that the pacific perception of 
this “natural frontier” region allowed for a plurality of 
configurations that would not be possible on the more 
contested and violent imperial fronts. Only when this 
region was integrated into a conceptually unified frontier 
did it become subsumed into a larger imperial security 
rubric—and once again became considered insecure. I also 
hope to challenge a dominant strain found in political 
histories of the broader Himalayan region that suggests 
British interest in the western Himalaya was driven 
almost exclusively by security concerns.6 Instead, I would 
like to suggest that the logics behind early to mid 19th 
century British interventions in the region were also 
concerned with commercial gains, securing recreational 
and residential space for colonists, and the technological 
practices that accompanied exploration and territorial 
solidification.
While the basic causes of the British East India Company’s 
expansion into the Himalaya may be explained in the 
broader context of European colonialism in South Asia, 
the specifics of British extension into the northwestern 
Himalaya present us with interesting and exceptional 
particulars. Prior to the 19th century, the northwestern 
Himalayan region had existed as a collection of small 
mountainous polities, at times highly autonomous, at 
other times contained within the political, economic, and 
cultural spheres of neighboring states. At no time till the 
British began solidifying their control of the region in the 
late 1840s, however, were these regions brought together 
under a unified border. The northwestern Himalaya—by 
the latter half of the 19th century—was incorporated into 
a single surveyed, mapped, and defended international 
frontier. That this frontier increasingly became an 
“international” one reflects the simultaneous processes of 
scientifically determining its location and diplomatically 
configuring those regions that lay beyond it. 
Recently, Kapil Raj has extended C. A. Bayly’s studies of 
information flows in late 18th and 19th century British 
India to examine the complex circulation of technologies 
around South Asia—technologies partially derived from 
indigenous British or South Asian sources and partially the 
result of hybrid colonial formations on the subcontinent 
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(Raj 2007). On the edges of the empire, the distribution 
of these technologies was particularly uneven. Early 
intelligence “failure[s] on the fringes of empire”—as Bayly 
has styled the British attempts at intelligence gathering 
during and immediately after the Anglo-Nepalese War 
(1814-15)—led to the re-evaluation and institutionalization 
of information gathering practices (Bayly 1996: 135-
141). In some cases, as Kapil Raj and Patrick Carroll 
have persuasively shown, colonial peripheries (India 
and Ireland, respectively) were at the forefront of 
technoterritorialization.7 In the case of the British in the 
northwestern Himalaya, this process is best illustrated by 
the construction of the Hindustan-Tibet Road, a project 
that coerced hundreds of thousands of laborers into 
the service of the British. In the essay that follows I will 
survey the different ways in which the British initially 
conceived of, and configured the northwestern Himalaya.  
After surveying British penetration into the region in the 
early 19th century, I will focus on their most substantive 
intervention in the region: the proposal, construction, and 
justification of the Hindustan-Tibet Road. 
Early Encounters
Unlike the evolution of the North-West Frontier, the 
northwestern Himalaya, once acquired by the East India 
Company, provided what was generally viewed by British 
policy makers throughout the 19th century to be “the 
finest natural combination of boundary and barrier that 
exists in the world” (Holdich 1916: 280). As the political 
fluctuations of early 19th century northern India shifted in 
favor of the British East India Company, the blank spaces 
on the existing maps increasingly overlapped with the 
Company’s growing political possessions. This physical 
and political expansion resulted in a burst of Himalayan 
exploration in the first half of the 19th century and 
the subsequent publication of a number of travelogues 
and official reports. In these texts, environment and its 
practical uses, as John MacKenzie (1986, 1988) has noted 
concerning the larger genre of British travel narratives, 
figures prominently. Reflecting a growing interest in 
natural history that would peak in the latter half of the 
19th century, many accounts of the Himalaya by explorers, 
surveyors, soldiers, hunters, or missionaries, included 
descriptions of and allusions to the environment.8 The 
findings of this growing network of scholars, policy 
makers, military officers, and amateur adventurers were 
increasingly being collected and published in the pages 
of the Royal Geographical Society’s Journal and associated 
publications. More often than not this “science” was for 
the practical benefit of the empire. The application of 
advanced and varied surveying techniques, in particular, 
led to the spatial codification of the Himalaya by the 
Survey of India’s “Great Trigonometric Survey” in the 
1860s and 1870s. 
The British East India Company first came into formal 
contact with the broader Himalayan region in 1774 
when Warren Hastings speculated on the significance 
of the Himalayan region for India’s defense and for the 
expansion of British trade (with Tibet and, through it, 
China) (Teltscher 2007: 49-50). That year he sent George 
Bogle to Bhutan and Tibet (which Hastings initially 
believed to be one state) in a first attempt to establish 
trans-Himalayan diplomatic and commercial relations.  
A few Western travellers had gone into the Himalayan 
regions prior to this.9 It was only with the Anglo-Nepalese 
War (1814-1815) and the territorial concessions that 
followed, however, that the British were brought into 
direct contact with the western Himalayan region. This 
contact, however, was gradual and (to use Aniket Alam’s 
phrase) “non-cataclysmic”; the regions’ terrain made the 
application of standard British administrative practices 
difficult to consistently and quickly implement. Instead, 
the British brought this region of diverse polities and 
diffused populations under a single administrator (the 
Superintendent of Hill States)—a slow and uneven process 
that reflected an early view of the region as non-essential. 
The seventy-five years following Bogle’s mission witnessed 
a substantial consolidation of many of the states in the 
northwestern Himalaya by a series of regional imperial 
hopefuls: beginning with the Gurkha rulers of Nepal, 
followed by the Sikh Empire (1799-1849) of Maharaja Ranjit 
Singh, and ending with the Dogra Maharaja Gulab Singh 
of Kashmir and Jammu and his successors ruling under 
British suzerainty. By the end of the Second Anglo-Sikh 
war (1848-9), the British directly administered a number of 
districts throughout the region, while allowing others to 
continue as indirectly ruled princely states. 
In 1768, the Gurkha leader Prithvi Narayan Shah 
unified the diverse ethnic groups of much of the central 
Himalayan region into the kingdom of Nepal.  When 
Chinese forces defeated them in 1792, they turned their 
attention westward and by 1804 had conquered all the hill 
states between Nepal and the Sutlej River (Ray 1986: 194). 
In 1806, Gurkha forces crossed the Sutlej and defeated 
the raja of Kangra. In desperation, Kangra’s ruler sought 
assistance from the Sikh Maharaja, Ranjit Singh. In May 
1809, Ranjit Singh sent forces to Kangra and pushed the 
Gurkhas across the Sutlej and subsequently made himself 
suzerain of that hill state and several others. 
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Following 1803, when the EIC took the Delhi territories, 
the Calcutta-based Company’s attention gradually turned 
northward, sending their first official expedition to gather 
information about the territories under Gurkha rule 
in 1808. “This expedition was sponsored by the Asiatic 
Society of Bengal and was ostensibly meant to explore 
the areas watered by the river Ganges” (Alam 2008: 99-
102). According to Aniket Alam, the published report of 
the expedition indicates that another goal was to gather 
information about the region’s economy (specifically 
the trade with the region known as Chinese Turkestan), 
its socio-political condition, and the nature of Gurkha 
administration.10 The report contains detailed references 
to the internal organization of the Gurkha rulers in this 
region, the nature of agricultural production, natural 
resources, and physical conditions. 
In 1818, the British sent a team under Alexander Gerard 
to explore the Sutlej and the possibility of trade across 
the mountains. This team eventually crossed into 
western Tibet along the route that would later become 
the Hindustan-Tibet Road.11 By the 1820s, British media 
reported sporadic accounts of western Himalayan 
commercial goods arriving in British-held towns 
(particularly Rampur, in Bashahr) along this route.12 
Slowly, the British began perceiving the pre-existing trade 
routes and commercial potential of the region. 
By the late 19th and early 20th century, historians of 
British India would provide a number of consistent 
explanations for this early British regional interest, all 
of which focused on the insecurity posed by neighboring 
states. Vincent Smith’s views on the Himalayan frontier 
combined the central problem of security of British rule 
with the need for maintaining British prestige. Smith, 
ironically, defended the British annexation of the southern 
regions of the western Himalaya on the ground that the 
Nepalis had appeared as the unwelcome conquerors—
“oriental despots,” as so many Asian dynasties were 
termed—and the memory of their harshness was still alive 
among local populations (Smith 1928).
Sir John Foster George Ross-of-Bladenburg, the biographer 
of Lord Hastings, similarly viewed the Himalayan frontier 
primarily from the perspective of defense. Discussing 
the effect of the Anglo-Nepalese War on the British, he 
observed, “it defined relations with Nepal—all danger 
for the Northern frontier removed for ever” (Ross-of-
Bladenburg 1893: 63, 82). With the exception of Paul 
Roberts, few historians by the late 19th century made 
any reference to the possibility of utilizing Himalayan 
resources—or its position as a commercial conduit—for the 
material benefit of British India (Roberts 1938). By the mid-
20th century we find the dominant view of the region’s 
history solidified in the work of Alastair Lamb. Writing 
primarily in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Lamb’s work 
focused on the evolution of frontiers into international 
borders between regional powers. The minimizing of 
commercial concerns in recounting the northwestern 
Himalaya’s 19th century history suggests that the security-
based narrative that became preeminent by the beginning 
of the 20th century had occluded all other considerations 
as the dominant historical trope. However, as we will 
soon see with Moorcroft’s travels, (and more significantly 
with the construction of the Hindustan-Tibet Road), the 
prospect of commercial gains in the western Himalaya was 
also prominent in the logic of expansion.  
Meanwhile, Ladakh was in a state of political turmoil as the 
result of a series of weak kings. William Moorcroft reached 
Ladakh’s capital in September 1820 while en route to 
Central Asia. His apparent project was to find more robust 
horse breeds to improve the EIC’s stock. The first officially 
practicing veterinarian in the Company, Moorcroft was 
also tasked with exploring the possibilities of opening up 
the trans-Himalayan region to British commerce. Although 
distrusted and obstructed by the Ladakhi officials in 
Leh, after two years Moorcroft managed to make several 
friends.13 During his stay, Moorcroft wrote detailed 
letters to Calcutta, noting the commercial and strategic 
importance of the region. He suggested that British control 
would allow them to access the pashmina trade from 
western Tibet, in addition to the potentially large markets 
of Central Asia (Moorcroft and Trebeck 2005: 151-154).
In May 1821, Moorcroft signed a commercial agreement 
with Ladakh’s rulers. Under the agreement, the EIC’s 
merchants were “permitted to trade with Ladakh and 
through it with the Chinese and Western Turkestan” (Ray 
1986: 198). His stay in Ladakh aroused the suspicions of 
Maharaja Ranjit Singh who sent envoys to Leh to look into 
Moorcroft’s activities. Moorcroft openly replied to the 
envoys that if the rumors of a Sikh military force being 
assembled were true, the pashmina industry of Kashmir 
would be greatly hurt. Moorcroft’s letter to the Sikh ruler 
was, according to Moorcroft, written to alarm him and 
avert any invasion of Ladakh until the Governor-General 
made a decision on whether to accept the Ladakhi ruler’s 
apparent request for aid. Moorcroft’s letter did not have 
the intended effect.
Ranjit Singh’s agent in Delhi passed the letter on to 
the British Resident and demanded an explanation. In 
response, the Governor-General wrote to the maharaja 
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explaining that Moorcroft had acted on his own and that 
the offer from Ladakh was rejected.
In 1834, Zorawar Singh, a general of the Dogra Raja of 
Jammu, Gulab Singh, invaded Ladakh. Over the following 
years he slowly pressed on towards Tibet in an attempt 
to further consolidate control over the trade routes and 
subdue a resisting Ladakhi populace (Panḍit 1970; Charak 
1977: 206-233). However, as he was marching towards 
Lhasa his supply lines became stretched during a severe 
winter and he was forced to retreat to Ladakh.14 On the 
return, however, he managed to capture Lahaul and Spiti, 
ensuring that Ladakh—if not western Tibet—would stay 
firmly within Dogra control.15 
A decade later, the Sikhs crossed the Sutlej—the boundary 
marker between Sikh and British territories—starting 
what became known as the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845-46) 
(Farwell 1972: 37-8). In March 1846, after a British victory, 
Ranjit Singh’s successor signed the Treaty of Amritsar. 
Under the treaty, Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler of the 
suzerain state of Jammu,16 was appointed the Maharaja 
of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, Baltistan, and Hazara. In 
exchange for this title, he recognized the supremacy of 
the British and agreed to a joint frontier commission to 
officially establish his state’s borders. He also agreed to 
pay the British an annual tribute of “one horse, twelve 
perfect shawl goats of approved breed […] and three pair of 
Kashmir shawls” (Drew 1875: 547). 
By the late 1840s we find official reports detailing the 
western Himalaya’s commercial assets, the disposition of 
its inhabitants, and suggestions for further exploration. 
In addition to pashmina, “in [the western parts of] this 
region there are magnificent forests of timber-trees; fruit 
trees and hedgerows are everywhere abundant” (United 
Kingdom, House of Commons 1854: 120-22).  Only two 
decades after Lloyd optimistically “discovered” the vaguely 
described “ready materials for another world,” that world 
had been annexed and soon would be classified, quantified, 
and made usable by the region’s newly hegemonic power. 
More importantly, because of the apparent security 
achieved by their expansion to the “natural” limits of 
northern India, the British would soon begin making use of 
their new territory in a variety of non-military ways. 
Trade, Servitude, and the Hindustan-Tibet Road
Unlike the tumultuous events taking place at the 
northwestern edges of British India, the 1846 settlement 
of Britain’s relations with the Princely State of Jammu 
and Kashmir made the still vaguely defined northwestern 
Himalaya one of the most stable portions of the imperial 
perimeter. Sparsely populated and naturally enclosed 
by some of the world’s highest peaks, the northwestern 
Himalaya could be leisurely explored, lightly administered, 
and easily defended. This stability convinced the Earl of 
Dalhousie (Governor-General, 1847-1856), who himself 
had begun to regularly visit the northwestern Himalaya 
(his favorite retreat was Kalpa in Kinnaur—then known 
as Chini), to explore the possibility of establishing trade 
roads through the mountains, in part to access the primary 
object of commercial interest: pashmina.  
Properly speaking, pashmina is the material woven from 
pashm, the downy undercoat of the Tibetan goat (changra: 
“north[ern] goat”). Janet Rizvi estimates that in 1823, “the 
annual turnover of the industry at first price (before the 
addition of taxes, manufacturers’ and middlemen’s profits, 
brokers’ fees, and transport costs) was estimated at some 
Rs30 lakh, amounting perhaps in today’s money to Rs120 
crore [roughly US$25 million]” (Rizvi and Ahmed 2009: 
13-14, 18). Its value reflects the vast distances and variety 
of groups long involved in this trans-Himalayan trade.  
Originating high up on the Tibetan Plateau in the goat 
herds of the semi-nomadic Changpa, the combed pashm 
was traded annually to Ladakhi or Kashmiri middlemen, 
who in turn sold the wool to Kashmiri merchants who, 
in turn, sold it to the great shawl-weaving houses of the 
Kashmir valley. Eighteenth-century European traders 
‘discovered’ Kashmiri shawls, which were marked by a 
characteristic woven design, a teardrop with a bent tip 
(Zutshi 2009). This design inspired one of the most often-
repeated Western textile motifs, commonly known today 
as “paisley.”
The presence of Muslim traders living in the 
predominantly Buddhist region of eastern Ladakh, as well 
as in Lhasa,17 further illustrates the deeply entrenched 
role played by the pashmina trade throughout the trans-
Himalaya. These trade routes were reinforced by the 
long-established connections between the Buddhist 
centers of Tibet and the predominantly Tibetan Buddhist 
regions of the western Himalaya. The reciprocal flows of 
pilgrims, religious students, and traders ensured a well-
worn series of routes with regular villages along the way to 
provide lodging, food, and fresh supplies of ponies, yaks, or 
donkeys. Regular pilgrimages to Mount Kailash in western 
Tibet also contributed to a steady stream of traffic. 
The British, like the Sikhs before them, wanted to 
access these trade routes and the potentially lucrative 
materials flowing along them. The single major British 
undertaking to accomplish this was the construction of 
the Hindustan-Tibet Road, from the plains up to Simla, 
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and then northeastward to Kinnaur, with a branch leading 
up through Spiti and Lahaul and another earlier branch 
from Dugshai to Ladakh. This project, begun in the spring 
of 1850, utilized hundreds of thousands of laborers in 
the course of its five-year construction (United Kingdom 
House of Commons 1857). More than sixty percent of the 
labor used was unpaid, furnished by the individual hill 
states as part of an agreement to offer indentured service 
(known as begar) to their suzerain rulers.
The initial justifications for such an undertaking were 
three-fold:  
First, the road could, over time, open up a commercial 
route to Tibet that would give the British dependable 
access to pashm, the raw material for pashmina ‘cashmere’ 
which was increasingly being demanded by the Victorian 
British upper classes.  Early in 1850 the Earl of Dalhousie 
wrote that, “this road had been mentioned to me before 
as being of great importance with reference to the large 
trade which it is believed might be attracted to the plains 
of India from the countries beyond the Himalayan range” 
(United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 4).
Second, the widening of the first stages of the road would 
quickly help ease the difficulties of a growing number 
of British tourists visiting the hills and their burgeoning 
“sanatoria.”
Third, they wished to abolish the begar system of 
indentured servitude, which in the tradition of ironic 
logics of rule in South Asia, they themselves had exploited.  
Historically, as John Bray (2008) has shown, forms of 
obligatory labor—most commonly referred to by the 
generic Persian/Urdu term begar—had long been present 
in the Himalayan hill states, Ladakh, Kashmir, and Tibet. 
This corvée labor had been used in road construction in the 
region at least as far back as the 16th century (Bray 2008: 
46). For the British, however, the system of local semi-
feudal obligations between hill chiefs and their peasantry 
offered a cheap and convenient means of travel in regions 
where “commercial transport and boarding houses 
economically unattractive” (Guha 2000: 25). In particular, 
begar allowed for transport to and around the growing 
number of hill stations, which the British were building 
in the foothills of the Himalaya. “As embodied in their 
settlement agreements,” Guha notes, “landholders were 
required to provide, for all government officials on tour 
and for white travellers (e.g. shikaris and mountaineers), 
several distinct sets of services.” These included laborers 
for carrying loads and building temporary rest huts, 
as well as provisions. According to the papers on the 
Hindustan-Tibet Road’s construction, the use of these 
indentured laborers appears to have been most widespread 
on the initial segment of the road, running from the 
plains at Kalka up to Simla, and in the general vicinity 
of Simla. As such, the alleviation of begar may have been 
the most immediate reason for expanding the existing 
rough road between the plains and Simla, but it was not 
deemed a major factor in constructing most of the road, 
which extended beyond Simla along the Sutlej and into the 
mountains towards the Tibetan Plateau.
The system of begar was increasingly criticized by the late 
1840s, and we find Dalhousie writing in 1850:
My first experience of the system, when my camp 
came to Simla in April 1849, satisfied me that it 
was a great and crying evil, and I have since that 
time both seen and heard much that has not 
only confirmed my conviction of the reality of 
the oppression, but has determined me to omit 
no effort to effect its removal. […] The first step 
towards this end is the formation of a road from 
Simla to the plains at Kalka, capable of being easily 
and safely travelled by baggage animals [United 
Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 3].
Table 1: Indentured labor 
expectations from certain 
Himalayan Hill States, 1852 
(United Kingdom, House of  
Commons 1857:39)
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The papers concerning the construction of the Hindustan-
Tibet Road—compiled into a single Parliamentary Report 
presented to the House of Commons in 1857—detail 
the technological and physical struggles to master the 
rivers, mountains, and passes of this terrain. The British 
attempt to physically intervene in this challenging 
landscape represented a substantial financial investment 
and an ambitious and laborious undertaking. Regarding 
the determination of the exact route of the road, one 
superintendent of the project wrote:
It…appears beyond a doubt that the best line 
between Thibet and Hindostan, whether in a 
commercial, mathematical, or political point 
of view, is one from the uplands of Chang Tang 
through Bassahir and Simlah to the plains near 
Kalka.  Here and here only has the awful barrier of 
the Himalayahs been pierced and its ramifications 
threaded by the waters of the Sutluj, so that passes 
of great elevation do not present themselves, and 
the mathematical correctness of the line is not 
impaired. This is the line that has been adopted for 
the Hindostan and Thibet Road... When completed, 
the keen reproach uttered by Moorcroft thirty-five 
years ago, will have lost its point and applicability 
[United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 73].18
Major J.P. Kennedy, the first superintendent in charge of 
overseeing the road’s construction, wrote regarding the 
process of planning the road:
The obviously correct mathematical line for a 
road passing from the plains northward through 
the Hill States, offering at once a commercial 
communication with Central Asia through the Hill 
States, and an approach to our several sanitary 
stations, was indicated by the course of the rivers 
Jumna, with some of its tributaries, and the Sutlej 
[United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 6-7].
Initially the project employed an average of 3,000 laborers 
daily. This number steadily increased. The irregular arrival 
of conscripted labor proved to be a continual problem 
for the overseers. One superintendent exasperatedly 
wrote in 1851: “When at last the numbers were down to 
so low an ebb that the native chiefs (threatened by the 
Superintendent of the Hill States) became alarmed, a 
large influx of wild hill-men was poured upon the road, a 
sufficiency of tools was wanting for so great an increase, 
and could not be procured at a moment’s warning; the 
mass was utterly ignorant of the work required of them” 
(United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 32). The lack 
of consistent labor and the apparent failure of the local 
chiefs to provide food and shelter for their own finally 
forced the road’s superintendents to pay more of their 
laborers a bare minimum wage. This increased cost 
resulted in a reduced expenditure on the construction of 
routes deemed to be of less immediate importance. The 
road from Simla to Ladakh, was considered one such route. 
This route, wrote Dalhousie, “intended to open up the 
commerce of central Asia with Hindustan, is of importance 
also, but its completion is of less immediate consequence” 
(United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 12). Enhancing 
access to the growing British sanatoria of the hills quickly 
became the principal short-term consideration of the road 
builders.
The project faced continued challenges for the next five 
years. Delays resulted in the experimental utilization of 
heavy quantities of gunpowder to demolish boulders that 
were impeding the road’s course. Similar technologies 
designed for military use were employed in surveying.  
In a letter to the Governor-General’s staff from a chief 
engineer, for example, the author notes that, “a gunner’s 
quadrant was used by the overseer” (United Kingdom, 
House of Commons 1857: 31).
Lieutenant Briggs, in his report to the Governor-General 
at the end of the 1852 working season, elaborated on 
the discovery of several local mines by describing the 
improved tools he was able to fashion from them. 
The proximity of these mines to the road may at a 
future period render the establishment of a foundry 
worthy of the consideration of Government.  As an 
experiment I last year made up some entrenching 
tools of this metal, at a cost of 50 per cent less 
than the price of the same description of tools sent 
from England. I issued them along with others of 
European manufacture to the working parties, and 
found they stood the ‘wear and tear’ better than 
the latter [United Kingdom, House of Commons 
1857: 43].
While the latter portion of the Hindustan and Tibet 
Road’s proposed route was surrounded by barren 
land, Lieutenant Briggs suggested that certain areas 
immediately surrounding the road could be planted with 
deodar, “thus in 20 years…the Government will be in 
possession of the finest timber in India” (United Kingdom, 
House of Commons 1857: 44). This potentially innovative 
solution to replenishing and expanding timber supplies 
depleted as a result of high demand for temporary bridges, 
workers lodgings, and cooking fuel never came to fruition.  
However, other regions of the Himalaya became heavily 
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utilized timber sources, particularly from the 1860s 
onwards (Guha 2000).
Throughout the documents relating to the road’s 
construction there is scant mention of the working 
conditions of the people who built it. One temporary 
superintendent, however, revealingly wrote that, “[t]he  
road coolies unquestionably suffer, and are mulet [i.e. 
mules] in every possible way, though this would be denied, 
and stoutly, and which is my firm belief, makes the coolies 
detest every one and every thing connected with the road” 
(United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 60).
Another brief glimpse of the terrible conditions under 
which the road’s builders toiled occurred on a segment 
of the road that required a tunnel, which employed 
roughly 10,000 prisoners a day. “Not the least remarkable 
circumstance connected with this work is, that it was 
constructed almost entirely by prisoners, and without a 
single accident. The night reliefs were alone composed of 
free labourers, and a few of the same class during the day, 
assisted the convicts in wheeling barrows, and in such 
work as their chains rendered irksome” (United Kingdom, 
House of Commons 1857: 47). These remarks reflect the 
sheer coercion and pain involved in much of the road’s 
construction.
By 1855, Lieutenant Briggs optimistically looked beyond 
the commercial value of the road, suggesting, instead that 
in the lower elevations there might one day be a colony 
of British retirees whose families will form the basis of a 
growing and “acclimated” army.
It has been stated by some, that the annual 
repairs of this road will be enormous. [...] As 
traffic increases, it will probably be necessary to 
metal certain portions of the line, but it is to be 
supposed that the increased traffic will afford 
increased income. But far above and beyond these 
considerations, is the opening out of the fertile 
vallies of these mountains to future European 
colonists. […] All, and far more than the early 
colonists of America ever promised themselves, is 
to be found here, where under the blessings of a 
mild and paternal government, the colonist might 
increase his store, as fully assured of safety to life 
and property, as if the scene were in the heart 
of Great Britain, instead of under the shadows of 
the mighty Himalayahs. Instead of permitting the 
old worn-out European pensioner to idle away all 
that is left to him of life, under the scorching sun 
of Chunar, it might be worthy the attention of 
government to give him a cottage and a spot that 
he might call his own within some of these elevated 
vallies; where, with something to occupy his time, 
he might, under proper superintendence, lay the 
foundations of an European colony; the youth of 
which, educated to a military life…might furnish 
our Indian army with recruits as strong, and better 
educated and acclimated, than the mother country 
does produce [United Kingdom, House of Commons 
1857: 80-1].
Briggs’ optimism here highlights the perception of the 
region as a secure space in which British pensioners and 
children might flourish, far away from any perceived 
threats or, indeed, from any boundary that requires 
defending.  
Responding to an earlier report by Briggs, Dalhousie 
triumphantly wrote:
The whole thing was experimental. People scoffed 
at the idea of being able to form a level road 
through these enormous mountains at all.  No 
estimate could be formed of the expense, for no 
data existed by which to calculate it.  Any reference 
to the Military Board would have been useless 
for this reason. I, therefore, took upon myself the 
responsibility of ordering its construction at once, 
directly under my own authority. I venture to think 
that the experiment has been eminently successful 
[United Kingdom, House of Commons 1857: 54].
The Governor-General’s tone here suggests that the 
project, or the technical challenge of it, may have been 
its own end. The road’s construction illustrated—to some 
at least—that one of the most challenging landscapes on 
earth could be “tamed.”
The massive undertaking of the road’s construction 
required a vast array of labor, a detailed accounting of 
the progress made and the quantities of earth moved, 
and the technological processes involved in surveying, 
constructing, and recording the project. Following 
1857—or the loss of Dalhousie’s patronage—it appears 
that the British Government of India lost interest in the 
commercial application of the road.   
The failure of the project to produce any significant 
commercial results, however, signaled British reluctance 
to continue opening up routes into the region. By the 
1870s, we find references to the road being occasionally 
used by a growing number of hunters, tourists, geologists, 
and botanists, but rarely by traders. One commentator in 
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the Pall Mall Gazette reviewing Major T. C. Montgomerie’s 
“Routes in the Western Himalaya, Kashmir, &c,” speculated 
that:
No attempt has been made to continue “the great 
Hindustan and Tibet road” past Pangay to the 
frontier of Chinese Tartary, and we understand the 
Indian Government has no intention of expending 
money on any such continuation at present. The 
Government has been blamed for not doing so on 
the alleged ground that without the completion of 
this road to the Chinese border the part which has 
been made is useless for the purpose of developing 
traffic; but the traffic on that line must always be 
very limited, and it was really rather for military 
than commercial purposes that the road was 
constructed as far as Pangay. [The Pall Mall Gazette, 
15 July 1874]
This last statement is intriguing. In the hundreds of pages 
of documents concerned with the road’s construction—
and in Dalhousie’s own published Private Papers—the 
overarching reasons given for its construction are always 
trade, access to hill stations, and the dubious alleviation of 
the begar system (Baird 1910). This anonymous reviewer’s 
insistence on the primacy of a military rationale behind 
the road’s construction suggests that by the time of his 
writing the frontier region was already being conceived 
of primarily as an instrument of imperial security. Instead 
of a conduit for trade it became viewed as a tool for 
defense of the empire. The questionable strategic value 
of the road’s location, however, casts doubt on whether 
such an undertaking would ever be financed without an 
anticipated revenue source.  
Furthermore, in all of the Parliamentary papers 
concerning the road’s construction and in Dalhousie’s 
own published writings there is no mention of stationing 
troops along its path beyond Simla or the construction of 
any garrison beyond those temporary structures built to 
house EIC officers involved in the project. Dalhousie was 
not a Governor-General who shied away from military 
projects and their justifications. Besides being known for 
his ruthless expansion of British possessions in South Asia 
(through conquest and his infamous Doctrine of Lapse), 
Dalhousie left behind him a tremendous series of public 
work projects (roads, telegraph lines, irrigation systems, 
and the beginnings of a railway system). But again, he 
never articulates a connection between the Hindustan-
Tibet Road and his broader infrastructural projects. 
Perhaps, then, the road was primarily a pet project of his—
simply an “experiment,” as he frequently described it, one 
with the possible addition of added revenue from trade 
in pashmina and an easy conduit for travelers seeking 
outdoor adventure. Or perhaps it was built—like many a 
monument—to symbolize territorial dominance and the 
challenge of the undertaking.  
That the road was a commercial failure, however, seems 
less debatable. There would be only one other bold British 
commercial undertaking in the northwestern Himalaya, 
that of the short-lived Central Asian Trading Company.  
This low-budget project, begun in the 1870s, attracted 
significant press coverage but failed in its objective of 
opening up the markets of Yarkand and Kashgar in Chinese 
Turkestan.  It’s most durable effect, perhaps, was the 
contribution to a growing pantheon of heroic imperial 
martyrs. While returning from Yarkand, a young Scot, 
Andrew Dalgliesh, was killed on the Karakoram Pass 
allegedly by an Afghan named Daud Mohammad.19 John 
Buchan would later embellish Dalgliesh’s story in A Book of 
Escapes and Hurried Journeys.
Other Avenues
While establishing regional hegemony and the less 
certain prospects of trade had been central reasons for 
the assertion of British control over the northwestern 
Himalaya, these were not the only reasons why the British 
increasingly ventured into the mountainous periphery of 
their domain. The Hindustan-Tibet Road was also, in Simla 
district, a conduit to a number of growing hill stations.  
As Pamela Kanwar and Dane Kennedy have persuasively 
shown, the lure of the mountains as retreats from the 
plains drew more and more British to the mountains in the 
mid-19th century (Kanwar 1990: 32-33).20 These towns could 
function for the British as retreats from the plains and as a 
nostalgia inducing chhota vilayat (“little England”).  Pamela 
Kanwar has aptly styled these hill stations as “imperial 
refuge[s]”. Early British recollections of Simla consistently 
play with the theme of familiarity to England. “It reminded 
me of home, the days of my boyhood, my mother and the 
happiest of varied recollections,” wrote William Lloyd 
of Simla in 1821 (Lloyd 1840: 141). The northwestern 
Himalaya could also, in its higher elevations, provide 
exciting exploration potential for vacationing Britons 
in the form of hunting, walking, or amateur scientific 
pursuits. 
While trade continued via local intermediaries in Kashmir, 
Ladakh, Spiti, Bashahr, Kullu and Lahaul, the bulk of 
British commercial activity in the broader region came 
to rest with the British Joint-Commissioners stationed at 
Leh beginning in the late 1860s. The commissioner was 
tasked with recording the volume of trade passing through 
Ladakh to and from the indirectly-governed princely state 
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of Kashmir and Jammu to the west, and to and from the 
directly- and indirectly-governed districts to the south. 
He also monitored any and all information coming from 
the north. By the 1870s, the British increasingly viewed 
the region as a geo-strategic boundary, one that would 
function primarily as a barrier to threats from Russia 
and Central Asia. This shift was facilitated in part by the 
escalation of security concerns brought on by the rebellion 
of 1857 and the threat of a growing Russian presence 
in Central Asia. But the inclusion of the northwestern 
Himalaya in this increasingly unified frontier was itself 
the result of a shift in ‘frontier’ thinking that came about 
through the epistemological and scientific mastery of the 
empire’s peripheral spaces, most prominently illustrated 
by the Survey of India’s “grand trigonometrical survey.”21  
The Survey drew upon the practical knowledge amassed 
during nearly a century of engineering and mapping 
projects that had been crisscrossing the less inaccessible 
parts of the subcontinent for nearly 80 years. In the 
Himalaya and Central Asia, the Survey developed new 
techniques of knowledge gathering that relied on 
technical innovations to mechanical instruments and, 
more importantly, the training of indigenous (or semi-
indigenous) “Pundits” as “intelligent instrument[s] of 
measure” (Raj 2007: 183). The projects in the region 
became covert, knowledge gathering exercises that 
relied on intermediaries in lieu of the broader avenues of 
infrastructural improvement and direct rule. Kapil Raj has 
shown that “[n]ovel survey methods had at times to be 
forged for terrains and circumstances that precluded the 
use of standard techniques.” Yet the knowledge produced 
out of these various surveying projects—diverse in their 
locations and practical particulars—could be configured 
as standardized applied scientific procedures and utilized 
universally. These technological processes increasingly 
became linked to security concerns.
Conclusions
When the political reconfigurations of the early 19th 
century settled, the British found themselves with a solid 
segment of the Himalayan region in their possession. The 
varieties of configurations that the space accommodated—
as a commercial conduit, as a retreat from the plains, 
and as an amateur laboratory for emerging sciences—
produced an array of uses for an apparently secure 
frontier. Furthermore, the construction of the Hindustan-
Tibet Road itself involved technoterritorialization, that is, 
“engineering land into the state in a way that extends, 
through particularizing scientific practices, the depth and 
reach of state power” (Carroll 2006: 171).
The security of this frontier, once technologically 
integrated into a cartographically unified space, was 
increasingly doubted by an anxious imperial regime after 
1857. The “forward” policies that would emerge in the last 
decades of the 19th century made such physical frontiers 
part of an imperial security complex that would require 
‘buffer states’ and neutralized spaces beyond the imperial 
domains. As Alfred Lyall wrote in 1891:
…[O]ur political influence radiates out beyond the 
line of our actual possession, spreading its skirts 
widely and loosely over the adjacent country….    
[T]he true frontier of the British dominion in Asia, 
the line which we are more or less pledged to 
guard, from which we have warned off trespassers, 
does not by any means tally with the outer edge 
of the immense territory over which we exercise 
administrative jurisdiction, in which all the people 
are British subjects for whom our governments 
make laws. [Lyall 1891: 313-14]
It was this reconfiguring of frontier space driven by 
increasingly hawkish Russophobia in the late 19th century 
that helped to convince Curzon to invade Tibet in 1903-4.
The period I have surveyed constituted an early phase in 
the establishment of British control in the northwestern 
Himalaya. A more detailed historical analysis of the region 
would be required in order to examine the administrative 
mechanisms through which this process was achieved. 
Furthermore, any comprehensive examination of this 
period must explore the responses to this process by the 
indigenous population, as well as by the many and varied 
foreign populations that long inhabited the region due to 
trade, religious routes, or prior imperial administration.22 
There is a bias described by social psychologists as “actor-
observer asymmetry” which asserts that individuals tend 
to describe their motivations for actions in situational 
terms while tending to describe the motivations for 
the actions of others in dispositional terms. Without 
discounting the existence of a British colonial “disposition” 
towards territorial expansion and perennial security 
concerns, it is worth remembering the contingent and 
“situational” nature of particular historical episodes in the 
British encounter with South Asia. When confronted with a 
newly acquired and apparently pacific space at the edge of 
their growing South Asian empire, British administrators 
attempted to make use of it in a variety of ways. It would 
be naïve to assume that security concerns were not 
present in the minds of British administrators during the 
first half of the 19th century, particularly given the East 
India Company’s nearly continual use of military force in 
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fulfilling its ostensibly commercial purpose. By the late 
1840s, however, the northwestern Himalaya was perceived 
to be sufficiently secure so as to allow for a variety of 
experiments that would not be possible on British India’s 
more contested frontiers. The building of the Hindustan-
Tibet Road represents the most prominent case of this 
experimentation. It was built in part to access unknown 
commercial markets and expand the ease of access to the 
growing British retreats in the mountains, but also, as 
Dalhousie noted, because “people scoffed at the idea of 
being able to form a level road through these enormous 
mountains at all.” In his estimation, “the experiment [was] 
eminently successful.” Those of us who have had occasion 
to travel along that road may disagree.
Endnotes
1. Lloyd is referring to Simla. Its Romanized spellings have 
varied over time, most recently settling on “Shimla,” which 
more accurately reflects its namesake, the Hindu goddess 
Shyamala Devi. For this paper I have used the dominant 
form found in the British sources, “Simla.” 
2. Aniket Alam makes a similar conclusion in the preface to 
his survey of the western Himalaya under British rule (Alam 
2008).
3. The British administrators whose papers I have 
examined understood the region to be part of China, or 
“Chinese Tartary” and were aware of the existence of 
nearby trade routes running from central Tibet towards 
“Chinese Turkestan” and Ladakh, largely as a result of the 
explorations of Moorcroft, Trebeck, Gerard, Lloyd, and 
others.
4. From the 1790s till Younghusband’s invasion in 1903-4, 
successive Tibetan governments in Lhasa would actively 
work to prevent incursions along their southern and 
western borders. This isolation became a political issue 
for the British once their own Himalayan borders became 
more technically defined in the latter half of the 19th 
century and they perceived it to be diplomatically and 
militarily necessary to establish diplomatic relations with 
Lhasa. During the time period discussed in this paper the 
British were aware of Tibet’s political isolation but had 
little information about the region that lay beyond the 
northwestern Himalaya. See Lamb (1986). The papers 
concerning the construction of the Hindustan-Tibet Road 
suggest that by 1850 British administrators still had little 
understanding of the territory that lay beyond their 
newly acquired northwestern Himalayan lands. However, 
as Lamb notes, “since 1792 the Chinese seem to have 
been…fully aware of the growing British power south of 
the Himalayas.” (1986: 49). It is clear that information 
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was moving much more clearly on the Tibetan/Chinese 
side of the Himalaya where reports of Moorcroft’s travels 
induced Lhasa to communicate to its frontier guards that no 
Europeans were to be admitted.
5. Lieutenant David Briggs, supervisor of much of the 
Hindustan-Tibet Road’s construction, cites William 
Moorcroft’s unheeded warning (circa 1820), that “whether 
[Tibetans and Central Asians] shall be clothed with the 
broadcloth of Russia or of England...with hardware of 
every description from Petersburgh [i.e. St. Petersburg] or 
Birmingham, is entirely in the decision of the Government 
of British India. At present there is little doubt to which 
the prize will be awarded, for enterprise and vigour mark 
the measure of Russia towards the nations of Central Asia, 
whilst ours are characterised by misplaced squeamishness 
and unnecessary timidity” (United Kingdom, House of 
Commons 1857: 73).
6. Foremost among these scholars is Alastair Lamb. 
Throughout his many published volumes he details British 
policies and the political antagonisms that produced the 
frontiers and borders of the greater Himalayan region: 
Lamb (1960, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1973, 1986). See also McKay 
(2003). McKay argues that the Younghusband mission of 
1903-4 was the culmination of a policy of British frontier 
expansion that began in the latter half of the 18th century 
and was accelerated by the “forward school” in the late 
19th century.
7. The term is Patrick Carroll’s. He writes: “I use the term 
technoterritoriality to emphasize the theoretical point that 
the issue of territory, in the context of the modern state, is 
only partly captured by reference to coercive or sovereign 
dominion within a landmass (which can include territorial 
waters, islands, and colonies). Modern territoriality involves 
engineering land into the state in a way that extends, 
through particularizing scientific practices, the depth and 
reach of state power” (Carroll 2006: 171).
8. A list of such texts would include the travel narratives 
of Lloyd and Gerard (1840), Moorcroft and Trebeck 
(1841), Vigne (1844), Thomson (1852), Hooker (1854), and 
Cunningham (1854).
9. For an example of such writings, see Desideri (1937). 
10. To the best of my knowledge, this report is only 
available in the archives of the Foreign Department, Secret 
Branch, National Archives of India. This material is thus 
drawn from Aniket Alam’s reading of this archive. 
11. Alam (2008), citing Herbert (1819) and Gerard (n.d.).
12. Cf. Calcutta Gazette (13 March 1828) and The Morning 
Chronicle (London) (22 September 1828), which detail the 
arrival of Ladakhi grain in the Punjab. 
13. Including the peripatetic Hungarian linguist, Sándor 
Kőrösi Csoma, who Moorcroft convinced to write the first 
English-Tibetan dictionary.
14. The Examiner (London), 12 February 1842: “Thibet: it 
at one time appeared probable that Zorawar Sing would 
succeed in wrestling from the Chinese some portion of their 
Thibetian territory. Our celestial friends, however, have 
now entered the field against the enemy; and the Seikh 
forces have given way, and are retreating on Ladakh, quite 
discomfited.”
15. For an account of this period in Urdu, see Pandit 
(1970).
16. Gulab Singh had earlier helped the British against the 
Sikhs.
17. Known in Tibetan and Ladakhi as the “Lhasa Ka-che.” 
According to Professor Karma Ngondup, “Ka-che” is likely a 
corruption of the Tibetan “khashi” (i.e. Kashmir).
18. For Moorcroft’s “reproach,” see note 5.
19. See Gill (2000) and Rizvi (1999).
20. See also Kennedy (1996).
21. For the history of this process from its inception 
through the mid-19th century, see Matthew Edney’s sem-
inal work, Edney (1997); for its gradual imbrication within 
the larger security state of British India in the latter half of 
the 19th century, see Raj (2007).
22. For an example of such work see Moran (2007). 
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